

participant in arms control studies in Cambridge, Washington and abroad since the early 1960's, he is known as a strong proponent of ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and of talks with Moscow to curb the missile race. No contribution he can make in his new post will be more important than the role he plays as efforts are made to bring these measures to fruition."

What is the background of Henry A. Kissinger?

A B.A. from Harvard in 1950, with the aid of a Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship for Political Theory. From 1951 to the present, he has been Director of the Harvard International Seminar which has been revealed as having been CIA financed in 1967. A Ph. D. from Harvard in 1954, under McGeorge Bundy. From 1954 through 1956 he was Study Director for the Council on Foreign Relations on Nuclear Problems. CFR, as is generally known, is substantially subsidized by Rockefeller money. In 1957 his CFR study expounding the theory of limited warfare was published under the title, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. From 1956 through 1958 he was Director of a Special Studies Project for Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc. In January of 1958 the "Kissinger Report" appeared. It dealt with military strategy and said the U.S. should spend \$3 billion on arms, and reorganize services under a single command, and prepare for limited warfare.

In 1958 and 1959 Kissinger was Research Secretary for a CFR discussion group on Political and Strategic Problems of Deterrence. The group also included Frank Altschul, Robert Amory, William C. Foster, Roswell Gilpatrick, Hans Morgenthau, Dean Rusk and James Perkins.

By 1961 Kissinger was Special consultant to President Kennedy on the Berlin Crisis. He was also consultant to the Operations Research Office, the Operations Coordinating Board, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, the Psychological Strategy Board, the National Security Council and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That same year, 1961, he published *The Necessity for Choice*, under the auspices of Harvard's Center for International Affairs which is also a probable recipient of CIA funds. Kissinger thanked both the Center and the Council on Foreign Relations for assistance, and also thanked the Carnegie Corporation and John Gardner.

In 1962 Kissinger was a full Professor at Harvard, on the faculty of the Center for International Affairs. In 1966 he published *Problems of National Strategy* under the Center's auspices. In 1967 he was cited in the New York Times as foreign policy advisor to Governor Rockefeller with regard to a reported soft policy on Vietnam (Oct. 4 issue). On July 14, 1968, when Governor Rockefeller announced a 4-stage pull-out for Vietnam, he cited Kissinger as his adviser.

Kissinger's ideas have often been self-contradictory. When this Service asked one of Washington's top experts on foreign policy to categorize Kissinger's ideas the reply came back that this was difficult to do because his basic thesis is presented in the form of a paradox. He says we must be militarily strong so that we can negotiate universal disarmament. He is fascinated with the thought that diplomacy will solve all our problems. Military strength is only one tool in the diplomat's pouch. The job of the military is to hold off the aggressor until brilliant diplomacy reconstructs world order.

One may read Kissinger's historical study of Metternich and Castlereagh entitled "A World Restored" to note his confidence in and fascination with diplomacy.

Our Washington contact said that Kissinger differs from McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow in that he places more emphasis on military preparedness, but his goals are essentially the same, i.e., the surrender of national sovereignty and nuclear superiority

through arms control and disarmament. It is a mistake, we were assured, to look only at his remarks on military preparedness because they mean little in the context of his obsession with arms control. The paradox in his thesis is evident in the following quotes from *The Necessity for Choice* (Anchor Books, 1962):

"We must be willing to face the paradox that we must be dedicated both to military strength and to arms control, to security as well as to negotiation, to assisting the new nations towards freedom and self respect without accepting their interpretation of all issues." (p. 9)

"The flexibility so often demanded of our diplomacy is impossible without a spectrum of military capabilities." (p. 58)

"Limited war is based on a kind of tacit bargain not to exceed certain restraints . . . it takes two to keep a limited war limited or a local defense local." (p. 62) (Compare this with our no-win type of Vietnam policy.)

"However paradoxical it may seem, the danger of escalation is one of the chief reasons why a strategy of limited war contributes to deterrence and also why, if deterrence fails, there is a chance of keeping a conflict limited." (p. 62)

"Any limited war must have some sanctuary areas." (p. 63)

"Limited war should not be considered a cheaper method of imposing unconditional surrender but an opportunity for another attempt to prevent a final showdown. We must enter it prepared to negotiate and to settle for something less than our traditional notion of complete victory. To be sure, the most likely outcome of a conflict fought in this manner is a stalemate." (p. 64)

"If we make the issue depend on 'purely' military considerations, any conflict is likely to expand by stages into a conflagration. . . . Graduated retaliation would not strive for a military advantage as such." (p. 68)

"We would have to weight the tactical advantage of nuclear weapons against the political cost. Once nuclear weapons were used in limited war, it is possible that the pressure of other countries to acquire nuclear weapons of their own would grow irresistible. Or else world opinion would impel a renunciation of a strategy which might appear to have brought humanity to the brink of a catastrophe. Whatever the likely result, the concern that use of nuclear weapons may have incalculable political effects could outweigh all military considerations." (p. 68)

"This is the measure of the task ahead. At the same time that we build up our capability for limited war and our conventional forces, we will be embarked on arms control negotiations of crucial importance. Our leadership must convince public opinion that we have to increase our military expenditures even while making earnest efforts to negotiate on arms control." (p. 97)

"Unilateral disarmament—tacit or avowed—and the quest for independent retaliatory forces are two sides of the same coin." (p. 116)

Liberal columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak commented on the appointment by Nixon of Kissinger very favorably. However, they deplored the choice of Dr. Richard V. Allen of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace as "senior staff assistant" to "the highly respected Dr. Henry Kissinger." Evans and Novak declare that "For his part, it is inconceivable that Kissinger will make much use of Allen. His personal aide will be not Allen but an outstanding young diplomatist (Daniel Davidson, currently an aide to Ambassador Averell Harriman). . . ."

New York Times reporter Hedrick Smith mentioned Allen and Kissinger on December

14, 1968. He wrote that Dr. Allen had maintained discreet contact with Dr. Kissinger during the Nixon campaign, and later with Dr. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, who advised Vice President Humphrey on foreign affairs in the election campaign. But Hedrick Smith pointed out that while Dr. Allen is known as a conservative or relatively hard-line analyst of Soviet affairs, "He is not, as he has explained to friends, a visceral anti-Communist who believes in a monolithic Communist conspiracy or that the Sino-Soviet dispute is a hoax." Congressional committees investigating international Communism have declared there is a conspiracy and the record points that out very clearly.

With the replacement of Walt Rostow by Henry Kissinger, will our policies in regard to the Soviet Union continue consistently to overlap or complement the Communist design? Will the 20-year old U.S. policy of mutual accommodation continue?

In March 1967 Senator Strom Thurmond delivered a major speech given no publicity at all to the Cornell University Forum. In discussing the international Communist conspiracy he pointed out the similarities between Soviet Policy and U.S. Policy as follows:

1. Soviet Foreign policy must not be identified with the organized world communist movement under Soviet domination. U.S. policy has shown no evidence of Soviet control of international communist conspiracy by Soviets. The Empire is now fragmenting. We should support independent Communist regimes.

2. Soviet Policy: There is no force in the world that can halt the advance of Soviet society. Our cause is invincible. We must keep a firm hand on the helm and go our own course, yielding neither to provocation nor to intimidation. U.S. Policy: Do not provoke the Soviets since this will increase the danger of general war. Bring about changes in Soviet Union by containment and Evolutionary processes, take no action which might escalate into general nuclear war.

3. World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics uniting the whole of mankind under the hegemony of the international proletariat organized as a state, is Soviet Policy. U.S. Policy says, no direct reference should be made to Soviet control of the international Communist Conspiracy. World domination theme should not be used against USSR. Changes are taking place within the USSR. They are mellowing into a peaceful state.

4. Soviet policy: Socialist Society leading to a world communist society. U.S. policy, bring about changes in Soviet Union by evolution instead of revolution. Support socialist causes. This will keep the violent form of communism from emerging. We are now moving through a period of great transition.

Regarding Cuba: Soviet policy has been to establish Missile Bases there in order to secure a Communist Base for subversion and reveal weakness of U.S. U.S. policy contends the establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces would be incompatible with Soviet policy.

Still regarding Cuba, Soviet policy has been that the USSR will support the Castro Regime and assure its continued existence as a Socialist state. U.S. policy is that we should peacefully coexist with Cuba since we cannot allow any military action to escalate.

Senator Thurmond also noted in 1967 that we were then in the midst of stopped up activity in the policy of "mutual accommodation," of which the prime factor was universal disarmament, both psychological and military. That remains true today. The Senator said the Soviet government, under orders from the Central Committee (of which the Soviet Government is merely the "front"), has been the most extreme advocate of all the steps of disarmament; and U.S. policy has fallen along in step. The

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